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State Sovereignty Under the Burger Court-How
the Eleventh Amendment Survived the Death of
the Tenth: Some Broader Implications of
Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon
GEORGE D. BROWN*
INTRODUCTION
The tenth amendment is dead! Long live the eleventh! So might run a sum-
mary of the status of state sovereignty doctrine after the Supreme Court's 1984
term. The decision in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority' has
attracted wide attention. Garcia not only directly overruled National League of
Cities v. Usery2 but also appeared to eradicate with broad strokes any tenth
amendment based doctrine of state sovereignty shielding states from the national
government. However, at the end of the term the Court, in Atascadero State
Hospital v. Scanlon,3 reaffirmed the validity of eleventh amendment jurispru-
dence, over the angry protests of four Justices who had been in the Garcia major-
ity.4 In this article, I examine the relationship between these two forms of state
sovereignty. The analysis suggests that viewing the eleventh amendment as an
embodiment of state sovereignty principles is the most satisfactory means of jus-
tifying the elaborate jurisprudence it has generated. In particular, I take issue
with critics of the amendment who present it only as a form of the discredited
doctrine of sovereign immunity. In a federal-as opposed to a unitary-system
of government, this analogy is false and masks the eleventh amendment's utility
in harmonizing tensions between the two levels of government.
After Garcia, however, the question arises whether eleventh amendment doc-
trine can stand on its own without the broader foundation of National League of
Cities. I consider the extent to which Garcia destroys this foundation and then
present an analysis of Atascadero and its implications. In holding that a private
individual could not sue a state for damages in federal court for an asserted
violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,5 the Atascadero Court
strengthened the eleventh amendment's limitations on Congress' ability to au-
thorize such a suit, whether Congress acts pursuant to its powers under the four-
* Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. A.B. 1961, Harvard; LL.B 1965, Harvard Law
School.
1. 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985).
2. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
3. 105 S. Ct. 3142 (1985). The Court also decided another eleventh amendment case at the end of the
term, Kentucky v. Graham, 105 S. Ct. 3099 (1985). The Court held unanimously that plaintiffs who
successfully sued state officials in their personal capacity for violations of constitutional rights could not
recover attorney's fees from the state, since the latter was not liable on the merits and had been dismissed
as a party. Idt at 3108. The decision in Kentucky v. Graham is particularly striking because it appears to
accept as valid much of the eleventh amendment doctrine that was hotly contested in Atascadero. Apart
from noting this particular aspect of the case, I do not discuss it in this article.
4. The Atascadero majority was composed of Chief Justice Burger and Justices O'Connor, Powell,
Rehnquist, and White. All but Justice White had dissented in Garcia.
5. 29 U.S.C. §§ 794-794a (1982).
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teenth amendment or under the spending clause.6 Under Atascadero, Congress
may abrogate a state's immunity to suit in federal court "only by making its
intention unmistakably clear in the language of the statute."'7 Recourse to legis-
lative history will not suffice, even in the fourteenth amendment context.
One might view Atascadero as contrary to the letter and spirit of Garcia.
8 I
examine at some length the arguments for irreconcilability, 9 arguments that are
strengthened by the fact that the Atascadero majority was composed essentially
of the Garcia dissenters. Yet I offer an alternative thesis: that the two decisions
are not only reconcilable, but also promote in the same way accommodation
between the powers of the national government and the interests of the states.
Eleventh amendment doctrine has substantial real world significance. It
places obstacles in the path of those who wish to sue states in federal court for
monetary relief based on the violation of federal law. The major unanswered
question is the extent to which it limits Congress' power to authorize such suits.
The prevailing academic view might be called the "congressional supremacist"
position.10 Professor Tribe, for example, views the amendment as giving the
states some protection from the national government. However, the protection
is limited to "rights conferred against the federal judiciary [rather than] rights
conferred against Congress."" Under this theory, Congress can authorize dam-
age suits against states in federal court as long as it speaks with sufficient speci-
ficity to ensure that the national legislature has considered the states' interests.12
Other commentators view the amendment as nothing more than confirmation
that the states possess a somewhat nebulous common law sovereign immunity.'
3
Under this theory, Congress can override the states' immunity without having to
meet any special rules of statutory construction. 14 Despite the doctrinal differ-
6. Atascadero, 105 S. Ct. at 3147-50.
7. Id. at 3147.
8. See id. at 3178-79 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 215 to 217.
10. H. FINK & M. TUSHNET, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: POLICY AND PRACTICE 152 (1984).
11. Tribe, Intergovernmental Immunities in Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation: Separation of Powers
Issues in Controversies about Federalism, 89 HARV. L. REV. 682, 693 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Tribe,
Intergovernmental Immunities]; see also P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART
AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 224 (1981 Supp.) [hereinafter
cited as HART & WECHSLER SUPPLEMENT] (Tribe's analysis "illuminating and helpful" in understanding
current state of eleventh amendment doctrine); Nowak, The Scope of Congressional Power to Create
Causes of Action Against State Governments and the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments,
75 COLUM. L. REv. 1413, 1441-42 (1975) (pragmatic problems of federalism posed by eleventh amend-
ment should be resolved by Congress, not by judiciary).
12. Tribe, Intergovernmental Immunities, supra note 11, at 695.
13. M. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 152
(1980); Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Part One, 126 U. PA.
L. REV. 515, 540-46 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Field, Part One]; cf. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651,
687 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (sovereign immunity nonconstitutional but ancient doctrine; states
surrendered immunity when they joined union to the extent that they ceded powers to the national
government).
14. Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Congressional Imposi-
tion of Suit Upon the States, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 1203, 1268-77 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Field, Con-
gresssional Imposition]. Although Professor Redish accepts the concept of a clear statement rule, he
criticizes the current Court for applying it "with a vengeance." See M. REDISH, supra note 13, at 165,
167-68; see also Atascadero, 105 S. Ct. at 3153-54 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (requirement that Congress
express its intention to abrogate states' eleventh amendment protection from suit in federal court in un-
mistakable language in statute itself unjustifiable; ordinary canons of statutory construction sufficient to
determine Congress' intent).
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ences, however, the commentators agree that Congress has the authority to re-
move whatever protection the states do receive under the eleventh amendment. 15
The only practical difference among them is the possible applicability of a clear
statement rule. For these commentators, Congress' authority should not depend
on which enumerated power it exercises. 16 Congressional supremacists may see
Atascadero as a tacit acceptance of their position, since the Court treated the
issue before it as one of statutory construction. However, I view Atascadero as a
tacit rejection of this position. The Court apparently still endorses a sliding scale
approach to evaluating Congress' ability to abrogate the states' eleventh amend-
ment protection. Under this view, Congress has- greater ability when exercising
its powers under section five of the fourteenth amendment 17 than in the context
of other coercive powers. (In the context of exercises of the spending power, the
Court has accepted the possibility that states may waive their eleventh amend-
ment protection through accepting funds.)18 Up to now the Court has been able
to finesse the issue of whether Congress intended to abrogate the states' sover-
eign immunity through statutory construction. 19 Eventually, however, Congress
will speak with the requisite degree of clarity. When the confrontation comes, I
believe that the Court will back down, despite Atascadero, and abandon the con-
cept of limits generated by the eleventh amendment. Any attempt to find such
limits would require the Court to differentiate among forms of regulated state
activity to determine whether the state had "waived" its eleventh amendment
protection. This inquiry inevitably leads to something like the distinction be-
tween "governmental" and "proprietary" activities, a distinction that was re-
jected in Garcia.20 On a more fundamental level, I read Garcia as rejecting any
differentiation among Congress' powers when it regulates the states as states.
What is left of the eleventh amendment then is a form of process federalism.
Yet it is process with a bite. One might view it as partial compensation for the
states' loss of substantive protection under National League of Cities. The
heightened clear statement rule ensures thorough consideration of the states' in-
terests at the congressional level. If a statute fails to meet this test, the issue of
damages may be raised again in individual suits in state courts. If the state
courts vigilantly attempt to vindicate federal norms while taking into account
15. A close reading of Professor Redish's book demonstrates the degree of agreement. He first de-
scribes Professor Field's analysis as differing "in subtle respects from that of Justice Brennan." M. RED-
ISH, supra note 13, at 147. He then discusses the Nowak-Tribe view and states that "although their
reasoning differs significantly, the ultimate conclusions of Professor Field and Professors Tribe and No-
wak appear quite similar." Id. at 150 n. 84. Professor Redish himself prefers "an approach similar to that
of Justice Brennan." Id. at 152.
16. But see id. at 153, 162 (congressional power to abrogate may, under current precedents, be limited
to exercise of power under fourteenth amendment). This represents Professor Redish's view of current
law, as opposed to his own preference for plenary congressional authority under any of Congress' powers.
See id. at 152.
17. Section 5 provides: "The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legisla-
tion." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 5.
18. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974) (states may waive eleventh amendment immunity
by participating in federally funded social program if federal statute clearly puts state on notice of waiver).
19. E.g., Employees of Dept. of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411
U.S. 279 (1973) (Fair Labor Standards Act does not manifest congressional intent to authorize private
damage suits against states).
20. 105 S. Ct. at 1013-15.
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effects on the state treasury, the eleventh amendment turns out to be neither
lawless nor toothless.
I. THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY
A. ELEVENTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE-AN INTRODUCTION
One of the most frequent criticisms of eleventh amendment jurisprudence is
that it is unduly confusing and complex.21 As a starting point, this seems sur-
prising since the language of the amendment is clear: suits against a state "by
citizens of another state, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state" are not to
be construed as within the judicial power of the United States, despite language
to that effect in article 111.22 The amendment might be seen as a narrowly
drafted provision designed to overturn a specific Supreme Court decision,
Chisolm v. Georgia.23 Nonetheless, in Hans v. Louisiana,24 the Court held that
the amendment also applies to in-state plaintiffs when they attempt to sue their
state in federal court on the basis of a federal question.25 Such a suit seems
squarely within article III and untouched by the amendment. The Court, how-
ever, viewed the amendment-and its repudiation of Chisolm-as a return to a
broader principle: the states are generally immune from the reach of the federal
judicial power, regardless of the nature of the plaintiff or the source of law upon
which the plaintiff bases the complaint.
26
Not surprisingly, things are not so simple. States can be sued by their citizens
in federal court in at least two different ways. First, the rule of Exparte Young
27
permits a broad range of prospective relief against a state officer sued in his offi-
cial capacity, even though the obvious effect of such relief runs directly against
the state.28 The Young Court justified this result by reasoning that, having vio-
lated the Constitution, the officer was "stripped of his official or representative
character," leaving him personally liable for his actions. 29 In Edelman v. Jor-
dan,30 the Court reaffirmed Young, but emphasized that the plaintiff in an Ex
parte Young-type suit against a state official cannot seek retroactive relief tanta-
mount to money damages.31 However, private individuals can sue their own
state in federal court for monetary relief including damages if Congress specifi-
21. See H. FINK & M. TUSHNET, supra note 10, at 137 (eleventh amendment case law "replete with
historical anomalies, internal inconsistencies, and senseless distinctions"); Gibbons, The Eleventh Amend-
ment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889, 1891 (1983) ("elev-
enth amendment today represents little more than a hodgepodge of confusing and intellectually
indefensible judge-made law").
22. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. For a discussion of the historical relationship between article III and the
eleventh amendment, see Nowak, supra note 11, at 1422-41.
23. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
24. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
25. Id. at 19-20.
26. Id. at 11-12, 16.
27. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
28. Young involved a challenge to a Minnesota statute establishing railroad rates. A railroad com-
pany's shareholders sued the state railroad commission and attorney general in federal court and sought
an injunction to prohibit them from enforcing the statute. Id. at 129-31. The attorney general challenged
the federal court's jurisdiction, arguing that the suit was, in effect, against Minnesota and therefore barred
by the eleventh amendment. Id. at 132.
29. Id. at 159-60.
30. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
31. Id, at 668-69.
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cally authorizes such a suit. A series of cases beginning with Parden v. Terminal
Railway 32 has developed an elaborate set of rules governing when the Court will
find that Congress has removed the states' eleventh amendment protection.
The operation of these rules is not always easy to fathom. One might expect
that it would be enough for Congress to pass a statute that, under a reasonable
construction, authorized private suits by in-state plaintiffs against states for mon-
etary relief. But the cases amount to a complex set of equations in which the
variables include the congressional power used, the degree of clarity within the
statute, the legislative history, and the state action that triggered the operation of
the statute. These rules lead to some awkward linguistic formulations, perhaps
reflecting the imprecise foundations of eleventh amendment doctrine itself. Thus
the Court has inquired into "whether the state by its participation in the pro-
gram authorized by Congress had in affect consented to the abrogation of...
immunity." 33 Such a requirement makes no sense. If Congress has the power to
abrogate, then consent by the state is simply not relevant. Conversely, if the
matter is one of consent, then abrogation is not an analytically helpful term. The
Court has also stated the question as whether a congressional statute contains
"an express waiver,"'34 although again logic suggests that any waiving is done by
the state rather than by Congress. Apart from its complexity and seeming incon-
sistencies, there is considerable disagreement over whether eleventh amendment
doctrine can be fitted under a general label such as jurisdiction, sovereign immu-
nity, or state sovereignty.35 The Court has used these terms, sometimes inter-
changeably, and all three can be found in the same opinion.
36
B. THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AS A JURISDICTIONAL DOCTRINE
Since the eleventh amendment parallels article III in its reference to "the judi-
cial power of the United States," there is considerable justification for viewing it
as just another subset of the complicated rules governing federal jurisdiction gen-
erally. The Court has held that the amendment is at least quasijurisdictional
since it need not be raised as a defense in the trial court.37 Individual justices
have elaborated on the jurisdictional analysis at greater length. Concurring in
Employees of the Department of Public Health and Welfare v. Department of
Public Health and Welfare,38 Justice Marshall agreed with the majority that
private plaintiffs could not sue for monetary relief in federal court under the Fair
Labor Standards Act. 39 His reasoning was not that Congress had failed to au-
thorize such suits,40 but that the eleventh amendment barred Congress from
32. 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
33. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 672 (1974).
34. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 344-45 n.16 (1979).
35. For an excellent discussion of the problem of attaching labels to eleventh amendment doctrine, see
Baker, Federalism and the Eleventh Amendment, 48 U. COLO. L. REv. 139, 147-65 (1977).
36. See Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 104 S. Ct. 900, 906, 911, 917 (1984) (Pennhurst
ii).
37. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. at 677-78. The Court stated that "the Eleventh Amendment defense
sufficiently partakes of the nature of a jurisdictional bar so that it need not be raised in the trial court." Id.
at 678.
38. 411 U.S. 279 (1973).
39. Id. at 287 (Marshall, J., concurring).
40. Unlike the majority, Justice Marshall found that the language of the statute was clear in authoriz-
ing private damage suits against states. Id. at 289.
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placing those suits in federal court. The plaintiff could have recourse to suit in
state court.41 For Justice Marshall, it was "clear that the judicial power of the
United States does not extend to suits such as this, absent consent by the State to
the exercise of such power." 42 In his view, Hans v. Louisiana43 essentially re-
stored the original understanding of article III. Thus, the eleventh amendment
did more than overturn Chisolm, and the Court in following Hans had been
correct in furthering the spirit of the amendment. 44 For Justice Marshall, this
particular limitation on Congress arises from the nature of the federal system
itself.
Justice Powell has gone even further and argued that the Hans rule flows from
an explicit jurisdictional limitation in the "plain language" of the amendment.45
Justice Powell reaches this conclusion by truncating the amendment in the fol-
lowing manner: "In language that could not be clearer, the Eleventh Amend-
ment removes from the judicial power, as set forth in Article III, suits
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States."'46 He apparently
justifies the omission of any reference to the person who brought the suit on the
ground that the amendment is a broad statement about the jurisdiction of federal
tribunals over states. In his majority opinion in Pennhurst State School and Hos-
pital v. Halderman47 (Pennhurst 11), Justice Powell went so far as to contrast
"the explicit limitation on federal jurisdiction contained in the Eleventh Amend-
ment" with the "judge-made" doctrine of pendent jurisdiction.
48
There are several problems with the jurisdictional approach to the eleventh
amendment. First, it is hardly as explicit in the language of the amendment as
Justice Powell would have us believe. Current eleventh amendment doctrine
represents a highly elaborate, policy-oriented construction rooted in the princi-
ples of federalism that are thought to underlie the text.49 This objection retains
considerable force even when one recognizes that the construction of article III
itself cannot be treated as simple interpretation of clear language. Perhaps more
to the point, the Court's treatment of the amendment conflicts with general prin-
ciples of article III federal court jurisdiction. A state can waive the amend-
ment's protection if it wishes to have the matter in question litigated, even
though no such waiver would be possible, for example, with respect to the exist-
ence of a case or controversy. 50 Moreover, the notion that Congress can over-
41. Id. at 291-92.
42. Id. at 290-91.
43. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
44. 411 U.S. at 291-92.
45. Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 525 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting).
46. Id.
47. 104 S. Ct. 900 (1984).
48. Id. at 917. In his majority opinion in Atascadero, Justice Powell utilized the jurisdictional analysis
in a novel manner. He argued that strict construction of statutes purporting to abrogate the states' elev-
enth amendment protection was justified in order to preserve the limited jurisdiction of federal courts.
105 S. Ct. at 3148.
49. Baker, supra note 35, at 165-66. In his Pennhurst 11 opinion, Justice Powell himself referred to "the
principles of federalism that underlie the Eleventh Amendment." 104 S. Ct. at 911.
50. Tribe, Intergovernmental Immunities, supra note 11, at 684-85. But see M. REDISH, supra note 13,
at 151-52 n.94 (that litigant can waive eleventh amendment immunity but cannot waive objection to lack
of judicial power under article III should not lead to other distinctions between these two limitations on
exercise of judicial power; difference explained by fact that eleventh amendment designed to protect state
as litigant while article III designed to avoid interfederal friction and to limit burden on federal courts),
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ride whatever limitations the amendment does impose is fundamentally at
variance with the article III principle that Congress cannot expand the jurisdic-
tion of the federal courts, a principle that can be traced to Marbury v. Madison.1
Attaching the jurisdictional label to the amendment is tempting, but it does not
explain the elaborate structure that surrounds this seemingly narrow provision.
C. THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AS SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
The label most frequently attached to eleventh amendment doctrine is that of
sovereign immunity. The Court's decisions and scholarly analyses are replete
with references to the amendment as constitutionalizing the common law doc-
trine of sovereign immunity.5 2 Such an analysis is hardly surprising. Eleventh
amendment jurisprudence does involve immunity from certain types of suits in
federal courts. To the extent that states do possess such an immunity, it may be
derived more from their somewhat sovereign nature than from anything in the
language of the Constitution. The Framers of the Constitution and of the elev-
enth amendment certainly were familiar with the concept of sovereign immunity.
Nonetheless, I believe that the sovereign immunity analogy is incorrect and can
lead to grossly inaccurate and unfair analyses of eleventh amendment doctrine.
The concept of sovereign immunity arose in unitary systems. The question in
any given country or state is the extent to which the sovereign entity may be
sued by one of its citizens. This is a matter of suit vel non. The sovereign itself is
the body that decides. In our federal system, however, the problem involves the
extent to which states may be subject to suit in tribunals of another sovereign, a
sovereign that is more than coequal. The policy considerations that underlie the
resolution of such questions are substantially different from those that arise in
the unitary context. One cannot properly address eleventh amendment issues
without considering the delicate relationship between the two "sovereigns"
presented by any attempt to sue the states in federal court.53 The sovereign im-
munity analogy has proven to have particular appeal to those who hope to elimi-
nate existing eleventh amendment doctrine. Sovereign immunity is a concept
that sounds unfair-"the king can do no wrong"-and has been increasingly
criticized.54 A powerful attack on the eleventh amendment can thus be mounted
by arguing that it is merely sovereign immunity in a special form. Critics of the
Court's continued adherence to Hans and its progeny, both on the Court itself
and in academia, have decried the eleventh amendment as the source of a "law-
less" doctrine on the ground that since it incorporates sovereign immunity, the
result must be that private parties have no recourse against states that violate
federal law.55 This description is not correct. The Ex parte Young fiction per-
51. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
52. E.g., Pennhurst 1, 104 S. Ct. at 910-11; M. REDISH, supra note 13, at 139-40; Tribe, Intergovern-
mental Immunities, supra note 11, at 683-85.
53. See Baker, supra note 35, at 165 (discussion ofjudicial role in balancing conflicting state and federal
interests).
54. See Pennhurst I1, 104 S. Ct. at 942 n.48 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
55. The notion of lawlessness is a principal component of Justice Brennan's attack on eleventh amend-
ment doctrine in his Atascadero dissent. 105 S. Ct. at 3150, 3154-56, 3178; see also Shapiro, Wrong Turns:
The Eleventh Amendment and the Pennhurst Case, 98 HARV. L. REv. 61, 71-76 (1984). According to
Professor Shapiro, "a concept designed to protect an individual government official from personal liability
has been transformed into a basis for total governmental immunity from suit." Id. at 76 (emphasis ad-
ded). Thus, in his opinion, the Court in Pennhurst II "took one more step away from the ideal of govern-
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mits a range of relief, so long as it can be labeled prospective. The United States
is not barred by the amendment and thus may sue on behalf of individual plain-
tiffs. 56 Moreover, there is the possibility of suit in state court, as Justice Mar-
shall noted in his Employees concurrence.5 7 This possibility will be explored at
greater length below. 58 The point is that the invocation of sovereign immunity
leads to a fundamentally false description of what existing eleventh amendment
doctrine produces: no relief for deserving plaintiffs. The argument is emotionally
appealing, but analytically flawed.
The sovereign immunity label can also trigger the application to federal-state
conflicts of an extensive body of sovereign immunity "law" developed to deal
with problems in unitary systems. This law itself is highly technical and confus-
ing. In his long dissent in Pennhurst II, Justice Stevens treated the problem of
pendent state law claims against state officials in Ex parte Young-type suits as
one that the law of sovereign immunity could answer.5 9 Such an inquiry ignores
the federalism issues presented by a complicated case like Pennhurst II. It may
lead to wrong answers. 6"
D. THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AS A STATE SOVEREIGNTY DOCTRINE
A more satisfactory approach to analyzing the barriers that the eleventh
amendment imposes on potential plaintiffs is to view the body of eleventh
amendment doctrine as a state sovereignty limitation on the national govern-
ment. By "state sovereignty" I mean a form of proteption, derived from the
Constitution, from certain actions by organs of the national government, which
can be enforced in the federal courts.61 Thus the amendment and the resultant
doctrine may be seen as a limitation on the national government derived ulti-
mately from the structure of the federal sy~t9qr, 62 At times, the Court has used
ment under law." Id. (footnote omitted). These observations were made in the specific context of
Pennhurst II. In particular, Professor Shapiro was criticizing an apparent extension of the Court's earlier
Larson decision. Professor Shapiro's comments appe.r to reflect, however, a general hostility toward
eleventh amendment doctrine.
56. United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128 (1973).
57. See supra notes 38 to 41 and accompanying text.
58. See infra text accompanying notes 229 to 236 (discussing possibility of suit by individual in state
court).
59. Pennhurst II, 104 S. Ct. at 924-39 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
60. Professors Fink and Tushnet, however, view eleventh amendment doctrine as "in the main, consis-
tent with the mature common law of sovereign immunity." H. FINK & M. TUSHNET, supra note 10, at
138. They also recognize that the law of sovereign immunity "is almost always unbearably arcane, shot
through with distinctions whose explanation is always puzzling." Id. at 137. If this is so, why add such
baggage to the already complex set of doctrines surrounding the eleventh amendment? These doctrines
reflect considerations of federalism as opposed to a transposition of common law principles. In this re-
spect, it is helpful to remember that in Exparte Young "the Court abandoned the use of general principles
of common law liability" in fashioning an equitable cause of action that overrides an eleventh amendment
defense. P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER's THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 935 (2d ed. 1973). But see M. REDISH, supra note 13, at 156 ("Ex
parte Young. . .suggest[ed] that the bringing of unconstitutional lawsuits was equivalent to a common
law wrong") (footnote omitted).
61. Unlike the tenth amendment, which under National League of Cities extended to both state and
local governments, the eleventh amendment protects only states, not their political subdivisions. See
Mount Healthy School Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 279-81 (1977) (local school district is "political
subdivision" and "not entitled to assert any Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in the federal
courts").
62. See generally Baker, supra note 35, at 165.
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the phrase "state sovereignty" in a way that appears to reflect such an under-
standing of the amendment. 63 At other times, reference to sovereignty reflects a
belief that what is at stake is sovereign immunity, as discussed in subsection C
above.
To some extent, the Court may be concerned with the symbolic effect of sub-
jecting a state to suit in federal court.64 This symbolic view of the amendment
would explain the otherwise curious analysis in Pennhurst II that permitting Ex
parte Young-type relief based on state law grounds against state officials already
properly in federal court violates the sovereign character of the state.65 Profes-
sor Nagel has noted the importance of symbolism in justifying a doctrine of state
sovereignty. 66 The principal concern, however, appears to be that of preserving
the state treasury from substantial depletion by organs of the national govern-
ment. This concern appears for the first time in recent cases in the majority
opinion in Employees.67 The Court noted that since the commerce clause was
involved, federal authority over state employees would be extensive.68 The
Court expressed apprehension about "how pervasive such a new federal scheme
of regulation would be."'69 To some extent, this language may reflect symbolic
concerns. In the same paragraph, however, the Court expressed reluctance to
find that Congress had placed "new or even enormous fiscal burdens on the
State." 70 This focus on protecting the state treasury became even clearer in
Edelman v. Jordan.7 1 The majority opinion drew a line between prospective and
retroactive relief in order to protect state funds, 72 and described the eleventh
amendment in general terms as a rule barring "a suit by private parties seeking
to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treas-
ury. ' ' 73 Similar concerns have been expressed in subsequent cases.74 Viewing
the protection that states enjoy under the eleventh amendment as a form of pro-
tection of their sovereignty makes sense. The states are shielded from the impo-
sition of retroactive, damages-type relief by federal courts exercising authority
under the general jurisdictional statutes and under section 1983.
75 Although
Congress can remove this protection, it is limited at least by the strict canons of
construction that make a finding of abrogation exceedingly difficult. Beyond
that, there is the question of whether additional judicially enforceable limits on
Congress exist. If so, a statute that transgresses those limits will be struck down.
63. E.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) (eleventh amendment embodies principle of
state sovereignty).
64. See Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85, 90-91 (1982) (eleventh amendment not limited to suits for money
damages). Of course, the rule of Ex parte Young runs counter to such symbolic considerations.
65. Pennhurst I, 104 S. Ct. at 911.
66. Nagel, Federalism as a Fundamental Value: National League of Cities in Perspective, 1981 Sup.
Cr. REv. 81, 101-03.
67. Employees of Dept. of Public Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S.
279 (1973).
68. Id. at 285-87.
69. Id. at 285.
70. Id. at 284.
71. 415 U.S. 651 (1971).
72. Id. at 665-69.
73. Id. at 663.
74. E.g., Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 337 (1979).
75. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982); see Quern, 440 U.S. at 33345 (section 1983's use of term "any person"
does not include states).
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The similarity between this form of state sovereignty protection and that elab-
orated in National League of Cities is obvious and has not escaped notice.
Professors Fink and Tushnet suggest that any limitations on Congress purport-
edly found in the eleventh amendment or the principle of sovereign immunity
may be viewed as "surrogates" for the limitation established in National League
of Cities.76 Several commentators have linked the two doctrines in a way that
suggests that eleventh amendment limitations, to the extent any exist, are at best
a subset of tenth amendment limitations on the underlying power of Congress to
pass the statute whose enforcement is challenged by the state on eleventh amend-
ment grounds.77 National League of Cities-and its revitalization of the tenth
amendment-plays an important role in recent analyses of the eleventh amend-
ment.78 Yet that case is no longer with us. In Garcia v. San Antonio Metropoli-
tan Transit Authority,79 the Court not only overruled National League of Cities
in its specific context, but also cast grave doubt as to the validity of any doctrine
of judicially enforceable state sovereignty limits on Congress. Therefore, the
question arises whether eleventh amendment "immunity" can survive as a sepa-
rate and independent manifestation of state sovereignty or whether principled
constitutional interpretation requires that the eleventh be buried along with the
tenth. To adequately address this question, it is necessary first to examine more
closely the elaboration of a principle of state sovereignty in National League of
Cities and the effects of Garcia upon that doctrine.
II. "TENTH AMENDMENT" STATE SOVEREIGNTY: R.I.P.?
A. NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY
The Supreme Court's best known and most controversial state sovereignty
case is the five-to-four decision in National League of Cities v. Usery.80 In Na-
tional League of Cities, the Court struck down a 1974 amendment to the Fair
Labor Standards Act that extended the Act's wage and hour provisions to most
employees of state and local governments. Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion
conceded that the legislation was a valid exercise of Congress' power to regulate
commerce, but drew a distinction between congressional regulation of private
individuals and regulation of "the States as States."81 The plurality opinion
found in the Constitution "affirmative limitations" that protect the states against
the exercise of even a plenary congressional power.82 The opinion cites the tenth
amendment as one declaration of sovereignty-based limits on Congress. 8 3 It is
the only constitutional provision cited. The opinion suggests that the concept of
state sovereignty is both explicitly "embodied" in the tenth amendment and im-
76. H. FINK & M. TUSHNET, supra note 10, at 152.
77. E.g., id.; Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction
of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather Than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV.
1103, 1109, 1114-15 (1983). But see Baker, supra note 35, at 179-80 (distinguishing between tenth and
eleventh amendments).
78. E.g., Field, Congressional Imposition, supra note 14, at 1218-22; Fletcher, supra note 59, at 1109-11.
79. 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985).
80. 426 U.S. 833 (1976). Justice Rehnquist wrote for a plurality of four. Justice Blackmun's concur-
rence supplied the fifth vote.
81. Id. at 845.
82. Id. at 841.
83. Id. at 842.
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plicit in the system established by the Constitution.84 In striking down the legis-
lation, the Court focused not only on the cost the legislation would impose on
subnational units of government but also upon the extent to which it altered
determinations by these units on how to structure the provision of services. The
opinion emphasizes the actions of state and local government in traditional gov-
ernmental areas and summarizes its holding as follows: "[I]nsofar as the chal-
lenged amendments operate to directly displace the States' freedom to structure
integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions, they are not
within the authority granted Congress by Art. I, § 8 cl. 3.' '85 There is an obvi-
ous kinship between National League of Cities, with its underlying premise of
state sovereignty limits on the national government, and the evolution of elev-
enth amendment doctrine. In fact, both the plurality and the dissent discuss
eleventh amendment decisions. 86 Apart from the desire to preserve symbolic
federalism, a concern for the well-being of the state treasury is central to both
branches of state sovereignty doctrine. Without the fiscal ability to provide serv-
ices, the states' role in the American dual system of government would be cur-
tailed, if not eviscerated. 87 There are both similarities and differences between
the tenth and the eleventh amendment contexts. Examining the major criticisms
of National League of Cities will help to focus on the relationship between the
two.
A principal criticism of National League of Cities is the inherent weakness of
the decision's textual basis, notably the heavy reliance on the tenth amendment.
In his dissent, Justice Brennan stated the problem bluntly: "[T]here is no re-
straint based on state sovereignty requiring or permitting judicial enforcement
anywhere expressed in the Constitution. ' 88 Supreme Court precedents in the
period between the New Deal and National League of Cities had, in fact, reduced
the amendment to little more than a "truism."8 9 The amendment is clearly tau-
tological; at best it emphasizes the importance of a restraining construction of
the powers granted to the national government in order to preserve those "re-
served" to the states. Moreover, critics have noted the paradox that the amend-
ment reserves whatever it does encompass both "to the states respectively" and
"to the people." 90 Therefore, the National League of Cities distinction between
regulation of private commerce and regulation of states as states stands on shaky
84. Id. at 844. "The expressions in . . . recent cases trace back to earlier decisions of this Court
recognizing the essential role of the States in our federal system of government." Id.
85. Id. at 852 (footnote omitted).
86. The majority cited Parden in a footnote discussing the governmental/proprietary distinction. Id. at
854 n. 18. Justice Brennan's dissent distinguished cases under the eleventh amendment on the ground that
congressional power to override that amendment's protection is plenary, unlike the tenth amendment
limitations that the majority had established. Id. at 858 n.2, 870 n. 11.
87. See Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: The New Federalism and Affirmative Rights to
Essential Governmental Services, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1075-76 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Tribe,
Unraveling National League of Cities]. Professor Tribe develops a rights-based analysis of National
League of Cities. He views the decision not as protecting states and localities as such, but as protecting
their ability "to meet their citizens' legitimate expectations of basic government services." Id. (footnote
omitted). The corollary of this protection is that citizens have a right to those services.
88. 426 U.S. at 858 (emphasis added).
89. E.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1940) ("amendment states but a truism that all is
retained which has not been surrendered").
90. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
states, are reserved to the states, respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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ground.91 Nonetheless, the drafters of the tenth amendment, as well as those
who ratified it, were trying to say something with a distinctly federalistic tone.
But reading into the words a doctrine of sovereignty-based immunity from exer-
cises of the national government's delegated powers may be stretching the lan-
guage beyond any reasonable bounds.
On the other hand, the eleventh amendment is perhaps too specific. It deals
not with generalities, but with the matter of suing states in federal court. It is
true that only one type of suit is forbidden: that "commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by citizens of another state, or by citizens or
subjects of any foreign state."' 92 This narrowness need not be a fatal obstacle to
the Hans construction, however. Suits against states by foreigners and other out-
of-state plaintiffs were the ones most vehemently discussed during the ratifica-
tion period, and Chisolm v. Georgia was an example of the phenomenon. 93 Since
these were the type of suits with which those who considered the matter were
most familiar, it is not surprising that they are singled out by the eleventh
amendment. Extrapolating from the narrow text of the amendment to a broader
policy against suing states in federal court, regardless of the nature of the parties
or of the cause, may be better justified by the text, its spirit, and its history than
by any attempt to ground National League of Cities' sovereignty principles in the
vague language of the tenth amendment.
A second major criticism of National League of Cities is its imprecise concept
of state sovereignty. Critics have fastened on the Court's concession that the
Constitution does not protect states in their role as law-giver, since Congress can
preempt that role by acting within one of its powers.94 Critics also note that
National League of Cities permits regulation of the states as states when they
leave the area of "integral" functions and enter what is sometimes referred to as
the "proprietary" area.95 The plurality opinion is also vague about whether the
impairment of state sovereignty results from the cost of the federal regulation
attempted in the statute or from some more generalized constriction of the
state's ability to make choices. Once again, Justice Brennan placed a barb:
"[M]y Brethren boldly assert that the decision as to wages and hours is an 'un-
doubted attribute of state sovereignty,'. . . and then never say why."' 96 It seems
likely that Justice Rehnquist did not want to restrict the judicial enforceability of
state sovereignty principles to cases in which a severe fiscal impact could be
shown. For him, the significant fact was the intrusion on the process of resource
allocation through structuring of services. Thus, the very imprecision of the Na-
tional League of Cities concept of state sovereignty might have provided a broad
building block for judicial decisions striking down all forms of congressional ac-
tion within the enumerated powers.
Arguably, less uncertainty surrounds eleventh amendment state sovereignty
doctrine: the amendment prohibits citizen plaintiffs from bringing suits against
91. E.g., Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities, supra note 87, at 1067-68 n.17.
92. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
93. For a discussion of Chisolm, see Gibbons, supra note 21, at 1920-26.
94. E.g., Michelman, States' Rights and States' Roles: Permutations of "Sovereignty" in National
League of Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE L.J. 1165, 1168 (1977).
95. Id. at 1171-72.
96. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 873-74 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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states in federal court to establish retroactive monetary liability. Of course, the
real world operation of this seemingly clear rule does not always protect the
public purse to the extent the doctrine intends. As Justice Rehnquist himself has
admitted, relief that fits under the "prospective" as opposed to the "retroactive"
heading may also have a substantial adverse effect on the state treasury.97 Fur-
thermore, the line between the two forms of relief is not always clear.98 Con-
gress' ability to abrogate the amendment is also uncertain. In sum, imprecision
is generated by efforts to give broad content to either amendment.
Justice Brennan99 and other critics of National League of Cities were most
alarmed by its notion of a judicially enforceable state sovereignty limit on na-
tional power. This criticism is based primarily on Professor Wechsler's seminal
article on the role of the national political processes in protecting the states.1°°
According to Wechsler, the states are sufficiently represented through the struc-
ture and orientation of the national legislature that they can rely on the political
process, rather than the judiciary, to protect their interests. As Justice Brennan
put it in his National League of Cities dissent, "[d]ecisions upon the extent of
federal intervention under the Commerce Clause. . .are in that sense decisions
of the States themselves."101 Professor Wechsler's thesis is not without its crit-
ics. His article appeared in 1954. Since then, argues Professor Kaden, changes
in the national political process have weakened any leverage that the states might
have had.'0 2 For example, Senators and Congressmen increasingly have come to
view themselves as national political officials, responsive to national concerns
and values. Professor Kaden's critique also has recently been buttressed by sub-
stantial empirical evidence from the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmen-
tal Relations.103 According to the Commission, the last two decades have
witnessed "a dramatic shift in the way in which the federal government deals
with states and localities."'10 The shift is away from cooperation and toward
coercion. The Commission categorizes the various techniques of intergovern-
mental regulation as "direct orders . . .crosscutting requirements, crossover
sanctions, and partial preemption."10 5 All four techniques permit such a sub-
stantial degree of federal control over the activities of state and local govern-
ments that the Commission has noted the risk of serious erosion of state and
local independence.' 0 6 A Wechslerian critique of state sovereignty as articulated
in National League of Cities would seem equally applicable to eleventh amend-
ment doctrine. If states do not need protection from Congress, then they do not
need it from federal courts enforcing federal norms enacted by Congress. To the
extent that the Court in Garcia utilized Wechsler's thesis to repudiate both Na-
97. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. at 667.
98. Id. at 666-68 (difference between two "will not in many instances be that between day and night").
99. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 856 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
100. Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and
Selection of the National Government, 54 CoIujM. L. REV. 543 (1954).
101. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 876 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
102. See Kaden, Politics, Money and State Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 847,
858-68 (1979).
103. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, REGULATORY FEDERALISM:
POLICY, PROCESS, IMPACT AND REFORM (1984) [hereinafter cited as REGULATORY FEDERALISM].
104. Id. at 1.
105. Id. at 7-10.
106. See id. at 51 (political safeguards of federalism described by Wechsler have been "badly eroded").
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tional League of Cities and its broader underpinnings, there are substantial impli-
cations for any vestige of state sovereignty under the eleventh amendment.
Therefore, it is essential to appreciate just how far Garcia goes.
B. GARCIA AND THE END OF STATE SOVEREIGNTY
Despite its apparently broad reach, National League of Cities proved to be a
decision of little generative force. In subsequent cases, the Court refined its stan-
dards for determining the presence of a state sovereignty limit on national power
into a four-part test that the states could rarely satisfy.10 7 In fact, the states lost
every post-National League of Cities case in the Supreme Court and fared un-
evenly at best in the lower courts.108 Still, the decision remained on the books,
and advocates for the state and local side of federalism debates could point to it
as a source of hope. 109 Speculation about a continuing role for National League
of Cities seems futile after the decision in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority. Garcia involved application of the same federal statute (the
Fair Labor Standards Act) to a municipally owned mass-transit system. The
narrow issue was whether such a system should be viewed as within the pro-
tected realm of "traditional" governmental functions identified in National
League of Cities.10 In reversing a judgment in favor of the authority, the Court,
by a five-to-four margin, overruled National League of Cities in exceptionally
broad terms. Writing for the majority, Justice Blackmun proffered four argu-
ments for this sweeping doctrinal shift. First, he contended that National
League of Cities had proven unworkable because of the impossibility of drawing
any line between those governmental functions that should benefit from an im-
munity and those that should not."' He rejected formulations such as "tradi-
tional," "governmental v. proprietary," "purely historical," or "uniquely"
governmental functions.1 2 He cited substantial evidence from the lower courts
107. In order to succeed, a claim that commerce power legislation is invalid under the reasoning of
NationalLeague of Cities must satisfy each of three requirements. First, there must be a showing that the
challenged statute regulates the "States as States." Second, the federal regulations must address matters
that are indisputably "attributes of state sovereignty." Third, it must be apparent that the states' compli-
ance with the federal law would directly impair their ability "to structure integral operations in the area of
traditional governmental function." Hodel v. Virginia State Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452
U.S. 264, 287-88 (1980). To this three-part test, the Court added an implied balancing of a state's sover-
eign interest against the federal interest the congressional action seeks to promote, cautioning that a tenth
amendment challenge might fail, even if it met all three requirements in "situations in which the nature of
the federal interest advanced may be such that it justifies state submission." 452 U.S. at 288 n.29. See
generally Note, National League of Cities v. Usery to EEOC v. Wyoming: Evolution of a Balancing
Approach to Tenth Amendment Analysis, 1984 DUKE L.J. 601.
108. The principal Supreme Court cases are EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983); FERC v. Missis-
sippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982); Transportation Union v. Long Island R.R. Co., 455 U.S. 678 (1982); Hodel v.
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981). For a listing of lower court cases with
varying results, see Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1011.
109. REGULATORY FEDERALISM, supra note 103, at 51. But see Schwartz, National League of Cities
v. Usery Revisited-Is the Quondam Constitutional Mountain Turning Out to be Only a Judicial Molehill?,
52 FORDHAM L. REV. 329 (1983) (predicting that National League of Cities will continue to have little
generative force). Although the Regulatory Federalism Report contains repeated references to the tenth
amendment as a source of state protection, there is only brief discussion of the eleventh. However, the
authors do characterize it as "designed to protect the sovereignty retained by the states." REGULATORY
FEDERALISM, supra note 103, at 33.
110. 105 S. Ct. at 1007.
111. Id. at 1011-16.
112. Id. at 1012-15.
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to prove that such labeling attempts were bound to be an exercise in futility. 113
Beyond questions of workability, Justice Blackmun found that permitting the
federal judiciary to make line-drawing judgments would itself impair the auton-
omy and freedom of states to make choices about activities that they would pur-
sue."t4 Justice Blackmun then singled out "a more fundamental reason" for
abandoning National League of Cities: "the sovereignty of the States is limited
by the Constitution itself."'" 5 He turned the 1976 formulation of state sover-
eignty on its head by focusing on the powers of the national government. For
Justice Blackmun, the issue of whether or not a'state possesses sovereignty
within a given area is determined by whether or not the Constitution has trans-
ferred power over that area to the federal government. 116 Thus, any judicial role
would seem to be limited to determining whether the national government had
acted within its sphere. Finally, Justice Blackmun reverted to the Wechsler ar-
gument discussed by Justice Brennan in his National League of Cities dissent:
since the structure of the national government adequately protects the interests
of the states, there is no need for any judicial policing of the national government
in the name of state sovereignty."17 As far as federal action under the commerce
power is concerned, Justice Blackmun stated his conclusion in terms that under-
scored the extent to which National League of Cities was overruled: "the princi-
pal and basic limit on the federal commerce power is that inherent in all
congressional action-the built-in restraints that our system provides through
state participation in federal governmental action." 118 Each of these arguments
and its possible implications for eleventh amendment doctrine will be considered
briefly at this point.
The problem of distinguishing between protected and unprotected governmen-
tal functions need not have been fatal to the principles of National League of
Cities. The Court might have refined the analysis beyond the crude "governmen-
tal v. proprietary" distinction. One circuit court of appeals had already formu-
lated such a refinement. 19 Another approach, articulated by two Garcia
dissenters, would balance competing federal and state interests in each case.' 20
Under such an analysis, a given activity would be protected from federal regula-
tion under some statutes but properly within the reach of others. This approach
is thus inconsistent with the concept of zones of state autonomy, a concept the
majority rejects altogether.12' Yet the zone approach, as embodied in the gov-
113. Id. at 1011.
114. Id. at 1015.
115. Id. at 1017.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1017-20.
118. Id. at 1020.
119. Amersbach v. City of Cleveland, 598 F.2d 1033, 1037 (6th Cir. 1979). The court found four
elements to be characteristic of a protected function: it benefits the community as a whole with little or no
direct expense; it is undertaken for public service rather than for profit; the government is the principal
provider; and community-wide need makes the government particularly suited to providing the service or
performing the activity. The lower court in Garcia had utilized the Amersbach formulation. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Auth. v. Donovan, 557 F. Supp. 445, 453-54 (W.D. Tex. 1983).
120. "A balance designed to protect our fundamental liberties." 105 S. Ct. at 1029 (Powell, J., dissent-
ing). "Weighing state autonomy as a factor in the balance when interpreting the means by which Con-
gress can exercise its authority on the States as States." Id. at 1037 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
121. Justice Rehnquist's dissent appears to accept the notion that National League of Cities rests on a
zone approach. See 105 S. Ct. at 1033 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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ernmental-proprietary distinction, plays an important role in the eleventh
amendment doctrine concerning Congress' ability to abrogate the amendment in
the exercise of its article I powers. Courts have suggested that this ability is
greater with respect to proprietary activities than with respect to governmental
ones.1 22 Thus, the shadow that Garcia casts over eleventh amendment doctrine
is immediately apparent.
Justice Blackmun's second argument-that federal judicial involvement in
state sovereignty controversies undermines subnational independence-is some-
what hard to follow. Presumably the states are better off with some judicial
limits on the federal legislation that regulates them than with no limits at all.'
23
Perhaps Justice Blackmun was laying a predicate for his more fundamental point
about the absence of any need for a judicial role in such federalism disputes. The
relevance, for eleventh amendment purposes, of this second argument may sim-
ply be limited to its repetition of his prior criticism of any line-drawing of the
governmental-proprietary sort.
Justice Blackmun's third and fourth arguments have significant bearing on the
continued existence of both eleventh amendment doctrine and any vestiges of
National League of Cities. The concept that states retain their sovereignty only
to the extent that Congress is not exercising one of its enumerated powers de-
stroys the conceptual underpinning of that decision: that regulation of "states as
states" is fundamentally different from regulation of private individuals. Justice
O'Connor argued forcefully that the greatly expanded reach of the federal com-
merce power to a wide range of state activities calls for a concomitant judicial
willingness to "enforce affirmative limits on federal regulation of the States to
complement the judicially crafted expansion of the interstate commerce
power."' 24  Unfortunately, from the state and local perspective, Justice
O'Connor was in dissent. For eleventh amendment purposes, Justice Black-
mun's analysis of the limited powers of the national government as a major
source of protection of the states' sovereignty may do away with any distinction
between congressional authority under the commerce power and other article I
powers on one hand and congressional authority to enforce the fourteenth
amendment on the other. The Court had previously indicated that Congress'
ability to subject states to damages actions may be greater when Congress acts
pursuant to its powers under section five of the fourteenth amendment than in
other contexts.' 25 This analysis appeared to rely on the limits that National
League of Cities imposed on reaching the states through the commerce power. ' 26
Garcia wipes out these limits.
Finally, there is the majority's wholehearted acceptance of Wechsler's thesis.
122. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Georgia Dep't of Natural Resources, 724 F.2d 1478, 1482 (11 th Cir. 1984)
(reconciling cases involving suits under Jones Act arising out of state ownership of vessels based on
whether or not vessels operated in proprietary capacity). At the Supreme Court level, use of the distinc-
tion in the recent eleventh amendment cases can be traced to Employees, 411 U.S. at 284-85.
123. See Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1027 n.13 (Powell, J., dissenting) (majority "'does not explain how leaving
the States virtually at the mercy of the federal government, without recourse to judicial review, will en-
hance their opportunities to experiment and serve as laboratories").
124. Id. at 1037 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
125. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445. 454-56 (1976).
126. See id. at 456.
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Although Justice Blackmun's opinion hints at judicially enforceable limits, 127
the central thrust of his fourth argument-that state sovereign interests find
their ultimate protection in the political process and its "procedural safe-
guards"128-leaves little room for a judicial role. This logic would also seem to
apply in the eleventh amendment context. However, requiring Congress to state
clearly its intent to override state "immunity" from damages suits in federal
court might be a way for the judiciary to ensure that the national political pro-
cess has protected the states. 129 This argument would preserve at least a rem-
nant of eleventh amendment jurisprudence. Four months after Garcia, the
Court did that and more.
III. ATASCADERO-THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT LIVES!
A. ATASCADERO, ANOTHER FIVE-TO-FOUR DECISION
Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon130 involved the availability of a private
right of action for damages against a state under section 504 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act of 1973.131 This "cross cutting" provision, applicable to all federal grant
statutes, 132 prohibits recipients of federal assistance from discriminating on the
basis of handicapped status. The plaintiff alleged that a California'state hospital
had denied him employment because he had a visual handicap. Since the hospi-
tal received federal funds, he invoked section 504, seeking compensatory, injunc-
tive, and declaratory relief. The eleventh amendment issue arose because a
compensatory award would come from the state treasury. The Ninth Circuit
resolved this issue in the plaintiff's favor.13 3 In a somewhat ambiguous opinion,
the court of appeals appeared to hold that Congress enacted section 504 pursu-
ant to the fourteenth amendment, thus abrogating any immunity California
might have,134 and, alternatively, that the state had waived its eleventh amend-
ment protection by participating in programs funded under the Rehabilitation
Act.' 35 The Ninth Circuit based the waiver argument on the ground that the
Act contained not only a prohibition against discrimination, 136 but also that the
state could foresee private suits to enforce the prohibition against any
recipient.
37
In a five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, hold-
127. Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1020.
128. Id. at 1018.
129. See infra text accompanying notes 223 to 226.
130. 105 S. Ct. 3142 (1985).
131. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
132. Section 504 applies not only to receipt of funds under the Rehabilitation Act itself, but also to any
program of federal financial assistance. For a discussion of cross cutting provisions, see REGULATORY
FEDERALISM, supra note 103, at 8.
133. Scanlon v. Atascadero State Hosp., 735 F.2d 359 (9th Cir. 1984), rey'd, 105 S. Ct. 3142 (1985).
The Ninth Circuit had previously decided the case in the defendants' favor, holding that § 504 was inap-
plicable unless the primary purpose of the federal financial assistance in question was to provide employ-
ment. Scanlon v. Atascadero State Hosp., 677 F.2d 1271, 1272 (9th Cir. 1982). The Supreme Court
vacated this judgment, 104 S. Ct. 1583 (1984), in light of Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 104 S. Ct.
1248 (1984). Darrone rejected a primary objective limit on § 504. Id. at 1253-55.
134. 735 F.2d at 361.
135. Id. at 361-62.
136. Id. at 360.
137. Id. at 362.
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ing that the eleventh amendment bar had not been removed. 138 Justice Powell,
writing for the majority, began by noting the general importance of the eleventh
amendment, which "implicates the fundamental constitutional balance between
the Federal government and the States." 139 In fact, he cited Garcia as authority
for the need to recognize the importance of states in the American constitutional
system!140 Nonetheless, his opinion treats the issues presented by Atascadero as
requiring nothing more than the routine application of previously established
requirements that Congress speak clearly if states are to be sued in federal court
for "retroactive monetary relief."141 Justice Powell directed the bulk of his anal-
ysis at whether section 504, as amended, would authorize such suits if Congress
had enacted it pursuant to section five of the fourteenth amendment. 142 He
never reached the question of whether fourteenth amendment legislation was
actually involved, apparently on the theory that even if it were, the relevant clear
statement requirements had not been met. 143 He first noted that, under eleventh
amendment doctrine, "in certain circumstances the usual constitutional balance
between the States and Federal Government does not obtain."' 44 He repeatedly
referred to the need for Congress to express clearly its intention to alter this
balance and stated that the expression of this intention must be found "in unmis-
takable language in the statute itself."' 145 The statute involved did impose a gen-
eral standard that handicapped people not be discriminated against in federally
funded programs. As amended, it also authorized the handicapped to utilize the
remedies provided in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,146 and authorized
the award of attorney's fees to any prevailing party other than the United States,
"in any action or proceeding to enforce or charge a violation of a provision of
this sub-chapter."' 47 This language, even if it could be read to constitute a gen-
eral authorization of suits in federal court to enforce the Act, was not enough for
Justice Powell when the eleventh amendment was at stake. The key to his abro-
gation analysis is that the statutory language itself did not contain an explicit
reference to states, a requirement he found established in several precedents.
Since the clear statement rule had not been satisfied, Congress had not properly
attempted to abrogate the state's eleventh amendment immunity. 48 Using a
similar rationale, Justice Powell then dismissed the contention that the state had
waived its immunity by accepting funds under the Act. He purported to apply a
different analytical framework, one relevant to enactments under the spending
clause. 149 The spending power cases had established that "mere receipt of fed-
eral funds," presumably with knowledge of the attendant obligations, does not
138. 105 S. Ct. 3142 (1985).
139. Id. at 3145-46.
140. Id. at 347.
141. Id. at 3144.
142. Id. at 3147-49.
143. Id. at 3149 n.4. Thus, Justice Powell avoided the difficult question of how a court determines
whether the fourteenth amendment was, in fact, utilized. The importance of this inquiry will disappear if
the Court ends up holding that Congress' ability to abrogate the eleventh amendment is the same regard-
less of the coercive power utilized.
144. Id. at 3148.
145. Id. Although the phrasing differs, the same requirement is found in id. at 3146, 3147, 3149.
146. 48 U.S.C. § 2000d (1982).
147. 29 U.S.C. § 794a (1982).
148. Atascadero, 105 S. Ct. at 3149.
149. Id. at 3149-50 n.5.
[Vol. 74:363
TENTH AND ELEVENTH AMENDMENTS
constitute consent to private suit for damages in federal court.150 Congress must
also give the state "notice" in the statute that the receipt of federal funds will
subject it to damage actions in federal court.15' According to Justice Powell,
Congress failed to satisfy this requirement, for whatever obligations the Rehabil-
itation Act imposes on states accepting funds under it, "[t]he Act. . . falls far
short of manifesting a clear intent to condition participation in the programs
funded under the Act on a State's consent to waive its constitutional immu-
nity." 152 Justice Powell's opinion suggests that the Court will use the same ap-
proach to determine whether Congress has attempted to abrogate a state's
eleventh amendment protection and, in the spending power context, whether it
has conditioned a state's receipt of federal funds on its consent to be sued in
federal court.
Justice Brennan devoted his long dissent primarily to a criticism of current
eleventh amendment law. Before reaching this larger issue, he argued that the
language and legislative history of section 504 did manifest Congress' intent to
abrogate any immunity the states might possess under existing doctrine.' 53 He
then reiterated his view that eleventh amendment doctrine itself is seriously
flawed because it is not "grounded on principles essential to the structure of our
federal system or necessary to protect the cherished constitutional liberties of
our people."1 54 Moreover, according to Justice Brennan, eleventh amendment
doctrine obstructs the will of Congress and frustrates the federal courts in their
essential function of enforcing and developing a uniform body of federal law. 155
In addition to creating an unfathomable set of rules, 156 the amendment, as per-
petuated by the current Court, flouts, in the name of federalism, "the principle of
state accountability to the rule of law."157 One might have expected Justice
Brennan to rely heavily on Garcia and its underlying premises. After firing these
opening salvos, however, he retreated to an extensive review of recent scholar-
ship as conclusive proof that the Court's post-Hans doctrine rests on a serious
misreading of the history surrounding the adoption of the Constitution and the
ratification of the eleventh amendment.15 8 False history, according to Justice
Brennan, had led to false doctrine.
Justice Blackmun, while joining in Justice Brennan's dissent, noted an impor-
tant link between Atascadero and Garcia. He viewed both eleventh amendment
doctrine and the tenth amendment jurisprudence of National League of Cities as
springing from overly broad constructions of constitutional language based on
incorrect premises as to the nature and principles of the federal system.' 59 The
majority and dissenting opinions in Atascadero indicate that an important consti-
tutional debate is taking place, even if the relationship of that debate to the argu-
ments raised in Garcia is little noticed. The full importance of the decision
150. Id. at 3150.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 3151-53 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
154. Id. at 3150. Justice Brennan used virtually the same language again at 3156.
155. Id. at 3154.
156. Id. at 3154-55.
157. Id. at 3155.
158. Id. at 3156-57. Justice Brennan also discusses postratification cases decided prior to Hans. Id. at
3167-72. For a list of the scholarly authorities relied on by the dissent, see id. at 3156 n.11.
159. Id. at 3179 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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becomes even clearer when Atascadero is compared with existing eleventh
amendment precendents.
B. ATASCADERO AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT-
CHANGING THE RULES
In requiring that the authorization to sue states for damages in federal court
appear on the face of the statute, Justice Powell changed the standard governing
the clarity with which Congress must address the issue of abrogation of eleventh
amendment protection in the fourteenth amendment context. In the initial case
establishing that Congress does possess such authority, Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 160
the statute was relatively clear on its face as to the amenability of states to dam-
age suits.' 61 The relevant precedent, however, is Hutto v. Finney.t62 Hutto au-
thorized the award of attorney's fees, which would be paid out of the state's
funds, under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976.163 The
Court viewed the Act as passed pursuant to the fourteenth amendment, 64 But
how much clarity the Court expected of Congress was itself less than clear. The
majority seemed to rely on the breadth of the Act-which did not mention states
by name-and on the specific legislative history addressing awards against
states.165 The Court specifically rejected the argument that "Congress must en-
act express statutory language making the States liable if it wishes to abrogate
their immunity."' 66 In his dissent, Justice Powell also viewed the decision as
allowing legislative history to substitute for clear statutory language. t67 None-
theless, the Court's analysis raises questions about how far Hutto permits the
search for abrogation to stray from the language of the relevant statute. The
majority noted that the case before it did not "concern retroactive liability for
prelitigation conduct rather than expenses incurred in litigation seeking only
prospective relief."' 68 This distinction suggested that the fee award fell within
the Ex parte Young doctrine permitting prospective, as opposed to retroactive,
relief.169 While the Hutto majority indicated that the eleventh amendment may
not even be relevant to awards of attorney's fees, 170 it also noted that a fee award
would not impose substantial fiscal burdens on the state involved.' 7' Justice Ste-
vens' majority opinion even suggested that the Court would have used a different
standard to judge the statutory language if Congress had sought to impose such
160. 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976).
161. Although the statute did not include states by name, its definition of "person" included "govern-
ments, government agencies, and political subdivisions." Id. at 449 n.2. In addition, Congress had de-
leted the previous exclusion of states. Id.
162. 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
163. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982).
164. 437 U.S. at 693-94.
165. Id. at 694.
166. Id. (emphasis added).
167. Id. at 706 (Powell, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 695.
169. Id. at 695 n.24.
170. See id. at 695-96 (Act imposes attorney's fees "as part of the costs"; costs traditionally awarded
without regard for states' eleventh amendment immunity because federal courts' interest in administration
of justice justifies treating state like other litigants).
171. See id. at 697 n.27 ("award of costs-limited as it is to partially compensating a successful litigant
for the expense of his suit-could hardly create any such hardship [enormous fiscal burden] for a State").
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burdens.1 72 Despite its ambiguities, Hutto's authorization for courts to go be-
yond the text of statutes passed pursuant to the fourteenth amendment in order
to find abrogation was approved the following term in Quern v. Jordan.73 Ac-
cording to Quern, the Hutto majority had correctly found congressional intent to
override the states' eleventh amendment protection in the Civil Rights Attor-
ney's Fees Awards Act, despite the absence of specific statutory language. "The
statute had a history focusing directly on the question of state liability; Congress
considered and firmly rejected the suggestion that states should be immune from
fee awards."1 74 While Quern perpetuated the notion that statutes imposing sub-
stantial fiscal liabilities on states "might require a formal intention of Congress'
intent to abrogate," 175 the case seemed to reaffirm the basic principle of Hutto:
either statutory language or legislative history can suffice when the question is
abrogation in the fourteenth amendment context. Commentators have viewed
this as a correct approach. 176 Against this background, it is clear that Atas-
cadero changed the rules for abrogation. In his majority opinion, Justice Powell
repeatedly stressed the need for "unmistakable language in the statute itself."' 177
Although the case might have come out the same way under previous stan-
dards, 178 this does not diminish the importance of the change.
An initial question is whether it was improper-as Justice Brennan argued in
dissentl 79 -for Justice Powell to apply a changed canon of construction to legis-
lation passed in 1973 and amended in 1978. As a general proposition, the meth-
ods for construing statutes are not cast in stone. The best known recent example
of a dramatic change in the Court's practice is its substantial alteration of the
standards for finding an implied right of action in federal statutes providing only
for administrative enforcement. 180 The entire Court apparently recognizes the
need for the change, although individual justices have disagreed on how to apply
the new standards. 181 As for the Rehabilitation Act, in his argument for uphold-
ing the Ninth Circuit's Atascadero decision, Justice Brennan relied heavily on
the 1978 amendments concerning the availability of remedies and attorney's
fees. 182 Yet these amendments were passed after the Court had decided several
of its major clear statement rule cases, including Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer.t 83
172. See id. at 696-97 & n.27 (while "it would be absurd to require an express reference to state liti-
gants whenever. . . a new item. . . is added to the category of taxable costs,". . . "we do not suggest
that our analysis would be the same if Congress were to expand the concept of costs beyond the traditional
category of litigation expenses.")
173. 440 U.S. 332 (1979).
174. Id. at 344-45.
175. Id. at 345 n.16.
176. Note, Reconciling Federalism and Individual Rights: The Burger Court's Treatment of the Elev-
enth and Fourteenth Amendments, 68 VA. L. REV. 865, 886-87 (1982); see also M. REDISH, supra note 13,
at 167 (discussing use of legislative history after Hutto).
177. Atascadero, 105 S. Ct. at 3148 (footnote omitted); see id. at 3146, 3147, 3149.
178. See infra text accompanying notes 203 to 215.
179. Atascadero, 105 S. Ct. at 3154 n.7 (Brennan, J, dissenting).
180. See generally Brown, Of Activism and Erie-The Implication Doctrine's Implication for the Nature
and Role of the Federal Courts, 69 IOWA L. REV. 617, 629-35 (1984) (discussing history of Supreme
Court's treatment of implied rights of action).
181. See, e.g., Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 25 (1979) (White, J., dis-
senting) (accepting Court's focus on legislative intent as standard for finding implied rights of action, but
criticizing majority's application of that standard).
182. Atascadero, 105 S. Ct. at 3151-53 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
183. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
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Although Justice Powell may have "tightened the noose"-as Justice Brennan
contended 4-he hardly introduced an unknown element into eleventh amend-
ment doctrine concerning the construction of federal statutes.
Somewhat more serious is the question of whether such a strict clear state-
ment rule is appropriate in fourteenth amendment cases. One must first consider
why Congress might have greater freedom to override the eleventh amendment's
protection when it acts pursuant to section five of the fourteenth amendment
than in the context of other powers.
One view, suggested by Fitzpatrick, is that the fourteenth amendment is
unique in terms of the relations of Congress and the states. The Fitzpatrick
Court noted that the amendment's "provisions are by express terms directed at
the states," 185 and quoted the famous statement from Ex parte Virginia186 that
enforcement of the fourteenth amendment "is no invasion of State sover-
eignty."'187 Thus, the underlying principles of the federal system, which gener-
ated eleventh amendment doctrine in the first place, call for an important
exception when another amendment that itself speaks broadly to federalism is-
sues is involved.
Alternatively, one might argue that eleventh amendment doctrine is an at-
tempt to balance respect for the role of states with the need to vindicate federal
rights. The fact that statutes enacted pursuant to the fourteenth amendment are
likely to vindicate particularly important rights justifies less eleventh amendment
protection.188 This argument seems less persuasive than the view suggested by
Fitzpatrick because Congress and the statute's beneficiaries may view as equally
important rights created under article I statutes.
Under either argument, Congress possesses special power when acting pursu-
ant to section five of the fourteenth amendment. Since no question of waiver by
the state is involved, the only relevant intent is that of Congress itself. The clear
statement rule ensures that Congress knew what it was doing to the states,189
but legislative history such as committee reports-as opposed to scattered floor
statements and manufactured colloquies-may be adequate to perform this task.
Justice Powell might reply that, given the nature of the legislative process, the
only sure evidence of what representatives or senators meant to vote on is the
actual bill before them. 190 Thus, for Justice Powell, "authorization grounded in
statutory language sufficiently clear to alert every voting Member of Congress of
184. Atascadero, 105 S. Ct. at 3154 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
185. 427 U.S. at 453.
186. 100 U.S. 339 (1880).
187. 427 U.S. at 454 (quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. at 346).
188. See Note, supra note 176, at 891 (Supreme Court has required less precise articulation of congres-
sional intent in fourteenth amendment context because of "paramount importance" of individual rights).
It is also possible to argue that the fourteenth amendment supersedes the eleventh since it was enacted at a
later date. See HART & WECHSLER SUPPLEMENT, supra note 11, at 231.
189. See Tribe, supra note 11, at 695 (clear statement rule would ensure that attempts to limit state
power are unmistakable).
190. Justice Powell expressed his view of the federal legislative process in his Garcia dissent:
Federal legislation is drafted primarily by the staff of the congressional committees. In view of
the hundreds of bills introduced at each session of Congress and the complexity of many of
them, it is virtually impossible for even the most conscientious legislators to be truly familiar
with many of the statutes enacted.
Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1031 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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the constitutional implications of particular legislation"' 191 is required to trigger
abrogation of the eleventh amendment. One could go even further and argue
that the very breadth of fourteenth amendment power over states requires such
clarity to protect the states from excesses of congressional zeal. Perhaps then the
real question is whether there should be any clear statement rule, instead of judi-
cial utilization of the normal canons of statutory construction. As I demonstrate
in my attempt to reconcile Garcia and Atascadero, the answer is emphatically
yes.192 For present purposes, it is enough to note that Atascadero helps focus the
inquiry by establishing that there is one clear statement rule to guide the elev-
enth amendment inquiry, regardless of the power under which Congress acts.
C. ATASCADERO AND THE SPENDING POWER-MERGING THE ABROGATION
AND WAIVER STANDARDS
Justice Powell treated the spending power analysis of the Atascadero facts as
an equally routine matter of applying existing precedents. On this point he may
be closer to the mark, although the statute presented questions not previously
addressed by the Court in any spending power case. Perhaps the most important
aspect of his analysis is the apparent conclusion that the degree of clarity needed
in a federal spending power statute to find a waiver by the state of its eleventh
amendment protection is precisely the same as that needed to find intent on the
part of Congress to abrogate that protection in the context of the fourteenth
amendment.
The starting point for spending power analysis of eleventh amendment issues
is Edelman v. Jordan.193 In Edelman, the plaintiffs sought relief for violation of
a federal welfare statute by the State of Illinois. The Court allowed prospective
relief, using an Ex parte Young rationale, but viewed the eleventh amendment as
barring any retroactive relief that would resemble the payment of damages from
the state treasury. The plaintiffs' cause of action might have come either from
the underlying welfare statute itself, under an implied right of action theory, or
from the express authorization to sue public officials provided by section 1983.194
The Court focused on the former possibility and on cases construing statutes
that, by their terms, authorized suit by designated plaintiffs against a general
"class of defendants which literally included States or state instrumentalities."195
The underlying statute in Edelman did not specifically authorize private suits.
Thus, the Court concluded that the mere fact of Illinois' participation in the
program, with knowledge of the attendant obligations, could not constitute a
waiver of its eleventh amendment protection. The Court reasoned that the stat-
ute must clearly inform the state that participation would subject it to private
suits for retroactive liability. Congress could only induce a waiver "by the most
191. Hutto, 437 U.S. at 705 (Powell, J., dissenting).
192. See infra text accompanying notes 223 to 226.
193. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
194. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party in-
jured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
195. 415 U.S. at 672.
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express language or by such overwhelming implications from the text as [will]
leave no room for any other reasonable construction."1 96 (In this respect,
Edelman foreshadows the approach Justice Powell used for both the spending
power and fourteenth amendment issues in Atascadero).
Even under this stringent standard, one might have expected the Court to
treat the section 1983 arguments more seriously. That statute is clear, both in its
creation of a right to sue and in its authorization of a damages remedy. 197 The
Court essentially brushed aside any section 1983 analysis by reading the statute
as being limited by the Ex parte Young doctrine. For the Edelman Court, Young
stood for the proposition that in suits against state officials the eleventh amend-
ment operates to limit the federal courts to "prospective injunctive relief."' 98
Quern v. Jordan,199 a successor case to Edelman, shed further light on section
1983. The Court rejected the contention that section 1983's reference to "per-
sons" includes states, thus permitting all forms of relief against them. Justice
Rehnquist found neither the language of section 1983 nor its legislative history
sufficient to support an abrogation. Unlike the statute in Fitzpatrick, the statute
in Quern did not explicitly refer to private suits against states. And unlike
Hutto, there was no "history focusing directly on the question of state liabil-
ity."2 °° The Court shifted the section 1983 inquiry away from the grantee's
knowledge of the statute and its consequences to an examination of congres-
sional intent.201 Justice Powell's Atascadero opinion did not mention a possible
section 1983 argument. Instead, he focused on Edelman and on its reaffirmation
in Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Florida Nursing
Home Association.202 From these cases, he drew the twofold proposition that
mere receipt of federal funds is not enough to constitute a waiver and that the
grant statute itself must clearly identify consent to waive as a condition prece-
dent to receipt.
However, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act is substantially different from
the statutes at issue in Edelman and Florida Department of Rehabilitative Serv-
ices. In addition to the underlying prohibition against handicapped-based dis-
crimination, it speaks to the issue of private enforcement in the following terms:
(A)(2) The remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. . . shall be available to any person ag-
grieved by any act or failure to act by any recipient of Federal assist-
196. Id. at 673.
197. There is debate over whether the reference to "laws" in § 1983 should be read as encompassing all
federal laws-the position taken in Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980)-or whether it should be lim-
ited to laws relating to civil rights and equality. I have argued for the latter position. Brown, Whither
Thiboutot? Section 1983, Private Enforcement and the Damages Dilemma, 33 DE PAUL L. REv. 31, 36-40
(1983). The point here is that if statutory language is the key to eleventh amendment analysis, the § 1983
argument in Edelman had considerable force.
198. 415 U.S. at 677.
199. 440 U.S. 332 (1979).
200. Id. at 345.
201. Thus the Court engaged in fourteenth amendment abrogation analysis rather than focusing on the
question of waiver discussed in Edelman. The fact that § 1983 is fourteenth amendment legislation may
justify this approach. Nonetheless, the language of § 1983 remains relevant to waiver analysis. See infra
text accompanying note 214.
202. 450 U.S. 147 (1981).
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ance or Federal provider of such assistance under Section 794 of this
title.
(B) In any action or proceeding to enforce or charge a violation of a
provision of this subchapter, the court, in its discretion, may allow the
prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's
fee as part of the cost.
20 3
Thus, the statute alerts the grantee to the possibility of private enforcement, in-
cluding actions in court given the reference to attorney's fees.
One might view the statutory context in Atascadero as analogous to that in
Parden v. Terminal Railway ,24 a case involving a different article I power.
Parden was a private suit for damages against a state-owned railroad under a
federal statute authorizing suit against "every common carrier by railroad"
when engaged in interstate commerce. The Court allowed a suit in federal
court.20 5 The broad remedies provided for in section 504, which refers to "any
recipient," are similar to those in the statute regulating railroads. Moreover, the
Parden Court noted that Alabama had consented to come within the statute's
ambit by operating the railroad. 20 6 Here, by analogy, the state may have con-
sented by accepting the funds.
Parden, however, is a weak leg to stand on.207 In Employees, a later case
involving almost identical statutory language, the Court found the eleventh
amendment to be a barrier to a private suit for damages, casting serious doubt on
the precedential vitality of Parden.20 8 Even if Parden can be justified as resting
on a governmental-proprietary distinction, that distinction would not help the
Atascadero plaintiffs. The state hospital seems clearly to fall on the governmen-
tal side of that elusive line.
More to the point, section 504 and the statute involved in Parden are substan-
tially different in terms of what they tell the "participating" state. Section 504
does mention private remedies, but one must refer to Title VI to find out what
they are. On its face, Title VI seems to contemplate administrative enforcement
only, although it does refer obliquely to "other means authorized by law."
'20 9
Thus, a state grantee might view the remedies component of section 504 as pri-
marily giving beneficiaries a right to trigger administrative mechanisms similar
to those in Title VI. The reference to attorney's fees can be read as applying to
suits brought by the United States, since it singles out the United States as a
party who cannot receive fees. The point is that, on its face, the remedies provi-
sion of section 504 does not put the state grantee on notice that it is consenting
to any form of private suit.
However, private enforcement of Title VI is possible under an implied right of
203. 29 U.S.C. § 794a (1982).
204. 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
205. Id. at 190.
206. Id. at 192.
207. See Faust v. South Carolina State Highway Dep't, 721 F.2d 934, 940-41 (4th Cir. 1983) (sweeping
language of Parden "sharply curtailed" by Edelman and Employees; court overrules earlier eleventh
amendment decision because it embodied reading of Parden that later Supreme Court decisions have
shown to be untenable).
208. Employees of Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S.
279, 282-87 (1973).
209. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1982).
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action theory.210 It might be assumed that similar suits would be available to
enforce section 504, and the Court has apparently so held.21' But should the
state grantee be expected to enter into a federal program with detailed knowl-
edge of the shifting sands of implied rights of action? Even if the answer were
yes, the availability of damages is an unsettled matter in Title VI suits generally,
regardless of the nature of the defendant.212 It is fair, in my view, to hold the
state only to those conditions deducible from the face of the statutes relevant to
the grant in question. This principle, enunciated by the Court in the first Pen-
nhurst case,213 ought to extend to remedial obligations imposed on a state, as
well as to its substantive duties with respect to the funds. 214 Thus, had Justice
Powell engaged in a more detailed examination of the rehabilitation statute, he
would have reached the same conclusion as a matter of existing eleventh amend-
ment doctrine, and would have been correct in doing so. Reconsider the opera-
tion of section 1983 in the grant context. The Court has held that section 1983
can be the basis for private suits to enforce grant conditions. 215 The finding of
an express cause of action is a more plausible reading of that statute than is any
discovery of a private right of action in the text of section 504. As long as the
Court adheres to its section 1983 holdings in Quern and Edelman barring mone-
tary awards against states, the result in Atascadero seems to follow a fortiori.
In the context of existing eleventh amendment doctrine, the Atascadero deci-
sion is significant for two reasons. First, it tightens the clear statement require-
ment when Congress has exercised its fourteenth amendment power: intent to
abrogate must be found of the face of the statute. Second, it reaffirms the rule of
prior decisions requiring the same degree of clarity in a spending power statute,
which triggers inquiry into whether the state waived its eleventh amendment
protection, as would be required by an abrogation statute. The two inquiries are
now the same. In the former instance, the clear statement rule ensures that Con-
gress knew what it was doing; in the latter situation it provides the additional
assurance that the state knows what it is getting into. Atascadero, however, has
broader significance. The Court chose to perpetuate eleventh amendment doc-
trine despite the total repudiation of state sovereignty in Garcia.
IV. GARCIA AND ELEVENTH AMENDMENT DOCTRINE
A. THE INCONSISTENCIES
Justice Blackmun may have been right that Atascadero's reaffirmance of elev-
210. See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Conm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 593-95 (1983) (recognizing private
right of action under Title VI).
211. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 104 S. Ct. 1248 (1984). In Darrone, Justice Powell said that
the Court did not reach the issue of a private right of action under § 504. Id. at 1252 n.7. However, the
Court proceeded on the basis that, at the very least, private equitable actions to enforce § 504 are avail-
able. See id. at 1252.
212. See Guardians, 463 U.S. at 595-97 (rejecting availability of compensatory damages for uninten-
tional violation of Title VI, but leaving question open with respect to intentional violations).
213. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 15-18 (1981).
214. See Brown, supra note 197, at 70-72 (discussing Pennhurst as possible foundation for rule against
awarding damages for violations of federal grant conditions). The Court's jurisprudence with respect to
principles of clear statement in the grant context is in a state of flux. See Bennett v. Kentucky Dep't of
Educ., 105 S. Ct. 1544, 1552 (1985) (ambiguities in grant program requirements should not "invariably be
resolved against the Federal Government as the drafter of the grant agreement") (dictum).
215. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
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enth amendment doctrine is totally irreconcilable with Garcia.2 16 The case for
irreconcilability can be summarized as follows. Both eleventh amendment doc-
trine and the tenth amendment limitations on Congress enunciated in National
League of Cities are state sovereignty principles which flow more from structural
assumptions about the American federal system than from specific constitutional
provisions. Far from having a life of its own, the eleventh amendment is best
understood as a narrow exemplification of the broad state sovereignty principle
set forth in National League of Cities. Since Garcia repudiated the theoretical
underpinnings of this broad principle, the subset must fall as well.
The basic premise of Garcia is that to the extent the states need protection
from the national government, such protection is amply afforded by the legisla-
tive processes of Congress. States are represented in the Congress; they enjoy no
such representation in the federal judiciary. Thus, there is no room for any ap-
proach that calls for different treatment of the "states as states" when laws af-
fecting them are otherwise within the powers of Congress. Yet under eleventh
amendment doctrine the federal judiciary may enforce limits on Congress. At
the very least, such a doctrine makes it substantially harder for the national
legislature to treat the states like everyone else in deciding when private damage
suits in federal court are appropriate for the enforcement of federal law. It may
even impose substantive limits. Therefore, the arguments at the core of Garcia
call, almost as an afterthought, for the repudiation of eleventh amendment doc-
trine, rather than for its reaffirmation in Atascadero.
Two other points are worth mentioning in this respect. First, Garcia involved
Congress' authority over the states in its exercise of the commerce power. Post-
National League of Cities cases had suggested that the Court would make a dis-
tinction between the fourteenth amendment and other grants of power when
considering both Congress' ability to regulate states and the narrower eleventh
amendment issue of its ability to subject them to suit in federal court.2 17 As
noted, Garcia eliminated any sliding scale of congressional authority over the
states that depends upon the power used. Since eleventh amendment doctrine
relies in part on such a distinction, this aspect of Garcia is merely one more nail
in the coffin.
Finally, although Garcia is a case about the power to regulate vel non, that
general power ought reasonably to include the lesser power of determining how
and where the regulation is to be enforced. If Congress can tell the states as
states how much to pay their workers, its authority "to make all laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution, '2 8 its powers should
include giving the workers the right to seek monetary redress for violations in
federal court. Again, the tension between eleventh amendment doctrine and the
thrust of Garcia is immediately apparent.
B. A POSSIBLE RECONCILIATION
One might stop here, noting with a shrug that inconsistent 5-4 decisions are
216. 105 S. Ct. at 3179 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
217. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 476 (1980); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 693-94 (1977);
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 452-53 (1976). Even Justice Brennan, at least at one time, accepted
the validity of the distinction. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 243 n.18 (1983).
218. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, c1.18.
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hardly unique these days and that Justice White's swing vote made the differ-
ence. Otherwise, the same Justices were on the same sides in both cases. In the
analysis that follows, I will argue that Garcia and Atascadero are, in fact, in
harmony with one another. The continued existence of eleventh amendment
doctrine is not just an untidy by-product of a federal system, but is instead a
means of preserving a necessary balance between the two levels of govern-
ment.219 At the outset, I disclaim any substantial reliance on differences be-
tween the two textual provisions involved. The eleventh amendment may be the
stronger provision, because it is specifically directed at the issue of suits against
states in federal court. It is hardly strong enough, however, to carry on its back
the entire weight of post-Hans doctrine. What justifies this doctrine is first, the
duty it imposes on Congress, and second, the introduction of a new set of actors:
the state courts.
Let us begin with Garcia. Justice Blackmun suggested provacatively that
there might be "affirmative limits [that] the constitutional structure. . . imposes
on federal action affecting the States under the Commerce Clause."'2 20 He left
open the question of whether such limits would be judicially enforceable. 22 Re-
quiring courts to consider whether "failings in the national political process" 222
have occurred would seem to implicate the political question doctrine. The
heightened clear statement rule enunciated in Atascadero, however, performs
precisely the function Justice Blackmun envisioned: it permits judicial oversight
of the legislative process to ensure that Congress has considered the states'
interests.
That a clear statement rule can be consistent with the Wechslerian view of the
national political process as the source of the states' protection hardly seems
novel. 223 Yet Justice Brennan attacks the Court's position that this statement
must be found in the language of the statute itself; Professor Field apparently
agrees, viewing a strict clear statement rule as a generally impermissible form of
judicial veto.224 Both assume that the rule makes it harder for Congress to act
because the Court is opposed to what Congress is doing.2 25 After Garcia, how-
ever, the rule counterbalances the states' loss of any substantive judicially en-
forceable limitations on congressional regulation. If Congress is the only source
of protection of the states' interests, it does not seem unfair for the Court to force
Congress to do its job. The Court does so not because it is implacably hostile to
damages suits against states in federal court, but because its role has been trans-
formed essentially into enforcing process guarantees. As I demonstrate below,
process guarantees are probably all that the states have left under the eleventh
amendment.2 26
219. See Employees of Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411
U.S. 279, 298 (Marshall, J., concurring) (limitations on state's susceptibility to damage action in federal
court "part of tension inherent in our system of federalism").
220. Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1020.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 1019-20.
223. See H. FINK & M. TUSHNET, supra note 10, at 142.
224. Atascadero, 105 S.Ct. at 3153-54 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Field, Congressional Imposition, supra
note 14, at 1273.
225. Atascadero, 105 S. Ct. at 3154 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Field, Congressional Inposition, supra
note 14, at 1273-74.
226. See infra text accompanying notes 244 to 250.
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Suppose that a statute does not satisfy the clear statement rule. That does not
mean it will not be enforced, as would have been the result under National
League of Cities. Enforcement in the form of damages actions will come in the
state courts, a second forum for the consideration of state interests. State courts
will probably be more familiar with the effect damage awards would have on the
state treasury, and will be more inclined to balance the competing interests.
Although such balancing might seem the province of equitable relief, it reflects
one of the underlying goals of the eleventh amendment: concern for the fiscal
well-being on the states. In this sense, the argument for state court enforcement
of federal norms that operate against the states parallels the arguments advanced
in the context of statutes withdrawing federal jurisdiction over certain classes of
cases. As Professor Bator has suggested in that context, "in interpreting the
constitutional provisions which restrict state power, it may be wise [and] . . .
politically healthy to give the state courts the opportunity in the first instance to
enforce federal constitutional restrictions on state power."'227 The goal of uni-
form interpretation of federal law is preserved not only through the vehicle of
ultimate Supreme Court review, but also by the fact that the lower federal courts
will entertain damages suits against nonstate defendants.
The question arises whether state courts will entertain damages actions against
states based on federal law.228 State courts hear a wide variety of suits to vindi-
cate federal rights.229 Whether state courts must entertain all federally based
suits remains an open question. They must at least entertain federal claims
analogous to judically enforceable state law claims,230 and it has been strongly
argued that they must enforce any valid federal law.231 The question seems
posed most acutely in the context of claims under section 1983. In 1980, the
Supreme Court offered the following ambiguous analysis in Martinez v. Califor-
nia :232 "We have never considered. . . the question whether a State must enter-
tain a claim under § 1983. We note that where the same type of claim, if arising
under state law, would be enforced in the state courts, the state courts are gener-
ally not free to refuse enforcement of the federal claim."' 233 The Supreme
Court's recent per curiam aflirmance of the South Carolina Supreme Court's
decision in Spencer v. South Carolina Tax Commission234 muddies the waters
even further.
227. Bator, Congressional Power Over the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 27 VILL. L. REV. 1030,
1037 (1982).
228. Cf M. REDISH, supra note 13, at 146-47 (questioning whether permitting damage actions in state
courts is consistent with purposes of eleventh amendment).
229. For a recent study of state courts' treatment of federal constitutional claims, see Solimine &
Walker, Constitutional Litigation in Federal and State Courts: An EmpiricalAnalysis of Judicial Parity, 10
HASTINGS CONT. L.Q. 213 (1983).
230. The leading case is Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947). The Court held that Rhode Island state
courts could not refuse to entertain treble damage actions under a federal price control act. The fact that
the same type of claims arising under Rhode Island law were enforceable may have played a role in the
Court's analysis. See C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 270-71 (4th ed. 1983).
231. See M. REDISH, supra note 13, at 124-38. Under this view, even state doctrines of sovereign
immunity would not exclude from state court those cases barred from federal court because of the elev-
enth amendment. See Wolcher, Sovereign Immunity and the Supremacy Clause: Damages Against States
in Their Own Courts for Constitutional Violations, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 189, 235-44 (1981).
232. 444 U.S. 277 (1980).
233. Id. at 283-84 n.7.
234. 281 S.C. 492, 316 S.E.2d 386 (1984), aff'd, 105 S. Ct. 1859 (1985) (per curiam).
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The Spencer plaintiffs were nonresident taxpayers who asserted that South
Carolina's administration of certain deductions discriminated against them in
violation of the federal Constitution. They sued pursuant to both section 1983
and South Carolina statutes permitting the assertion of such taxpayer claims.
The South Carolina courts agreed with the plaintiffs' contention under the privi-
leges and immunities clause and ordered a refund.235 The trial court did not
address the issue of the availability of section 1983, a matter of considerable
importance to the plaintiffs since the use of section 1983 would trigger the Civil
Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act. The lower court treated the action as one
brought pursuant to state statutes, which authorized the claim but denied costs
such as attorney's fees. The South Carolina Supreme Court devoted one para-
graph to this issue, holding that section 1983 is remedial only and that resort to
it in this case would circumvent state remedies for asserting federal rights.236 A
divided United States Supreme Court affirmed without opinion. 237 The signifi-
cance and status of Spencer are unclear. Many state courts view themselves as
bound to hear suits brought pursuant to section 1983.238 However, the South
Carolina court read Martinez v. California as permitting state courts to refuse to
entertain section 1983 claims.239 This result can perhaps be justified if one rea-
sons that the Spencer plaintiffs did not win a "state law" victory, but instead
received full vindication of their federal law claim under an alternative remedy.
The problem with justifying Spencer on these grounds lies in language found in
Monroe v. Pape,24° the bedrock case of section 1983 jurisprudence. In Monroe,
the Court said that "it is no answer that the State has a law which if enforced
would give relief. The federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and
the latter need not be first sought and refused before the federal one is in-
voked. ' 241 The Monroe court clearly envisioned the presence of state law claims
against public law officials, rejecting the notion that they must somehow be ex-
hausted. At the same time, the reference to remedies casts doubt on the South
Carolina court's rejection of the availability of section 1983. The important ele-
ment in Spencer is the availability of fees, an issue that, strictly speaking, is dis-
tinct from the obligation to entertain federal claims. Spencer hardly is the last
word on this matter, especially given the nature of its affirmance. 242 Even read
broadly, however, the case does not stand for any general disavowal of the obli-
gation of state courts to enforce federal law. An important premise of Justice
Powell's Atascadero opinion is that the state courts were open to hear the very
claims presented.243 In sum, I would argue, the eleventh amendment is neither
inconsistent with the landmark decision in Garcia nor the enemy of the rule of
law as charged by Justice Brennan. Admittedly, the extent to which one accepts
235. 281 S.C. at 496, 316 S.E.2d at 388.
236. 281 S.C. at 497, 316 S.E.2d at 388-89.
237. 105 S. Ct. 1859 (1985) (per curiam).
238. For a list of states whose courts will hear § 1983 actions, see Steinglass, The Emerging State Court
§ 1983 Action: A Procedural Review, 38 U. MIAMI L. REV. 381, 385-87 n.15 (1984).
239. 281 S.C. at 497, 316 S.E.2d at 388-89.
240. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
241. Id. at 183.
242. See, e-g., Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 191-92 (1972) (decisions by evenly divided court lack
precedential weight); Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263 (1960) (opinion unnecessary since nothing has been
settled).
243. Atascadero, 105 S. Ct. at 3146 n.2.
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the view offered here may depend on precisely how the eleventh amendment
affects Congress. Does it impose limits, depending on which power is used, or
does it impose simply a process? That process would be the refined clear state-
ment rule, now applicable across the board. Since Congress can satisfy the rule,
it may permit private damages suits against states regardless of the power
utilized.
C. THE BURGER COURT AND THE CONGRESSIONAL SUPREMACIST POSITION
The congressional supremacist position reflects the latter reading of the rele-
vant eleventh amendment cases. It is true that the Court has never struck down
a statute authorizing such suits. Any victories for the states have been won on
the field of statutory construction. At the same time, the Court has never explic-
itly accepted the supremacist position and has suggested that it will reject it if
directly faced with the question. 2 "4 These inferences are reinforced by the ma-
jority opinion in Atascadero. Read in the broader context of eleventh amend-
ment doctrine, Justice Powell's analysis appears to rest on the proposition that
there are only two ways around the amendment-waiver and abrogation-and
abrogation can be accomplished only when Congress acts pursuant to the four-
teenth amendment.2 45 The emphasis on the fourteenth amendment as the pre-
requisite to abrogation is consistent with the opinion in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, in
which Justice Rehnquist stated that Congress may, under the fourteenth amend-
ment, "provide for private suits against States or state officials which are consti-
tutionally impermissible in other contexts. '2 46 If the confrontation does occur, I
believe that the Court will back down, notwithstanding its insistence on the con-
stitutional dimension of the states' eleventh amendment protection.2 47 Other-
wise, Atascadero and Garcia will indeed be in conflict. The issue would most
likely arise in a federal suit for damages against a state under a statute passed
pursuant to the commerce power. Garcia vitiates any notion of a different status
for commerce clause enactments. Justice Blackmun emphasized this point when
he stated that "the principal and basic limit on the federal commerce power is
that inherent in all congressional action-the built-in restraints that our system
provides through state participation in federal governmental action. '2 48 This by
itself may be enough to prevent the Court from holding that Congress cannot
provide for enforcement of a commerce power enactment in this manner.
An equally persuasive argument for the Court's treating a commerce clause
statute in the same way as a fourteenth amendment statute is based on another
part of Garcia. Any concept of eleventh amendment limits on the commerce
power seems to require an inquiry into the nature of the state activity Congress
244. See Brown, Beyond Pennhurst-Protective Jursidiction, the Eleventh Amendment, and the Power of
Congress to Enlarge Federal Jurisdiction in Response to the Burger Court, 71 VA. L. REV. 343, 392-93
n.290 (1985). In this article, I took the position that the supremacists had read too broadly the cases
involving congressional authority under the fourteenth amendment as extending to all congressional pow-
ers, and, further, that a distinction between the fourteenth amendment and other powers made sense. I
adhere to that criticism. As for the distinction, although it has appeal, see supra text accompanying notes
185 to 189, it is no longer tenable after Atascadero.
245. Atascadero, 105 S. Ct. at 3145.
246. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) (emphasis added).
247. E.g., Atascadero, 105 S. Ct. at 3145-46; Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974) (question is
one of waiver by the state of "its constitutional protection under the Eleventh Amendment").
248. Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1020 (emphasis added).
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has regulated. The reason for this inquiry is that Congress, in exercising its coer-
cive power over commerce, must at least be able to do what it can do in the
exercise of the noncoercive spending power: induce states to waive their eleventh
amendment protection. Thus, one must examine the state activity covered by a
given statute to see if a waiver has taken place. For example, could the state be
deemed to have "consented" to the regulation, as was found in Parden?249 Such
inquiries inevitably lead to the drawing of lines based on the degree of choice the
state had, and, one suspects, to the rehabilitation of the governmental-proprie-
tary distinction. Yet Garcia rejects this distinction as a means of drawing lines
to protect the states from congressional action. Unless the Court wishes to fight
that battle again-a fight that some justices may welcome25 0-it seems unlikely
that the discredited govermental-proprietary dichotomy will continue to play a
role in the eleventh amendment context.
CONCLUSION
The eleventh amendment stands, despite the demise of the tenth. The states
may feel that they have been given a choice in the question of where to be
hanged, but denied any choice over the question of whether they shall be.251 If
the Court accepts the supremacist position, the eleventh amendment becomes
process federalism only, as opposed to the "substantive federalism" reflected by
National League of Cities.252 Yet it is process federalism that grants the states
meaningful protection. The clear statement rule assures them at least one bite at
the apple-in the sense of full consideration of their interests at the congressional
level. If the statute does not meet this stringent test-and many congressional
enactments, like that involved in Atascadero, will not-then the states at least get
to have their fiscal interests considered by a body that will be sensative to them:
their own courts. A balance is struck, a form of equilibrium attained. Others
might strike the balance differently, but I view the end state described here as
faithful to the principles of federalism and to the rule of law.
249. In Parden, the Court concluded that Alabama had accepted the conditions of the Federal Employ-
ers' Liability Act by entering into the operation of an interstate railroad 20 years after passage of the Act.
377 U.S. at 192.
250. See Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1033 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); id. at 1038 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Both Justices expressed an intention to fight for a restoration of National League ofCites. It is not clear,
however, whether Justice O'Connor's advocacy of a balancing test that weighs state autonomy as a factor
would reinstitute a zone approach. See id. at 1037.
251. I am indebted to Professor Silberman for the metaphor. Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of
an Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. REv. 33, 88 (1978).
252. The term is Stewart Baker's. Baker, supra note 26, at 178. He views the tenth amendment as
protecting substantive federalism, while the eleventh protects only a "formal federalism." Id. at 178-80.
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